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STORIES ABOUT PROPERTY
William W. Fisher Ill*

PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY,
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP. By Carol M. Rose. Boulder:
Westview Press. 1994. Pp. ix, 317. $24.50.
For a decade, Carol Rose1 has been writing provocative essays
about the history, doctrine, and theory of private property. Irreverent, unpredictable, learned, and concise, these articles have been a
pleasure to read. The same traits make them wonderful teaching
tools. It is thus not surprising that several excerpts from Rose's essays have found their way into first-year Property casebooks.2
Many Property teachers, myself included, go further, assigning entire articles.3 Each year, some of the most energetic classroom discussions spring from those assignments.
Property and Persuasion contains eight of those articles plus a
previously unpublished essay, Seeing Property (pp. 267-304). For
two reasons, the book is better than a set of copies of the original
essays. First, although Rose has sensibly left unchanged the arguments of the individual articles, she has updated many of the footnotes and pared others. The resulting essays are both more current
and more trim. Second, she has included many substantive crossreferences, suggesting how the theses of the articles relate to one
another. These links make it possible to see how the various parts
of Rose's complex conception of property hang together - or, as
will be suggested below, in some instances do not hang together.
Among the characteristics that make the essays so refreshing is
their unusual narrative form. These are not typical law review articles, marching predictably through premises, analyses, and doctrinal
applications. They are quirky and surprising. Sometimes, like
Faulkner novels, they go over the same ground two or three times,
examining a doctrine or problem from various points of view. For
example, in The Comedy of the Commons (p. 105), perhaps the best

* Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1976, Amherst College; J.D. 1984, Ph.D.
1991, Harvard University. - Ed.
1. Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization, Yale Law School.
2. See, e.g., JESSE DuKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 19-20, 37-38 (3d ed. 1993).
3. My personal favorite for these purposes is Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN.
L REv. 577 (1988), which I assign when I am discussing conveyancing. Professor Joan Williams reports that students in her Property classes regularly find that Women and Property:
Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv. 421 (1992), is the most eye-opening of all the
readings in her course.
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essay in the book, she studies the development of American and
English "public property" doctrines from many angles, and each
perspective is sufficiently different that the reader does not lose
patience.
Sometimes the essays change course suddenly. For example, the
bulk of Possession as the Origin of Property (p. 11) consists of an
effort to identify the economic logic underlying the "first-occupancy" principle - the notion that the first person to reduce an
unowned object or animal to "firm possession" owns it. But two
pages from the end, the tone changes abruptly from panglossian to
critical. The :first-occupancy principle may have served effectively
to maximize the material welfare of the Europeans who conquered
the Western Hemisphere, Rose insists, but its central presupposition (that human beings are outsiders to nature) made no sense to
- and indeed helped justify the forcible ouster of - the Native
American population.4 The shift is jarring, and that, presumably,
was her intent.
Finally, like Dorothy, Rose frequently strays from the road of
her own argument. These detours, instead of distracting, contain
many of the most memorable parts of the book. For example, the
primary topic of the final essay, Seeing Property (p. 267), is whether
it is good or bad that ownership is so closely related to vision that property as a socioeconomic institution depends heavily on visual markers and codes (fences, maps, photographs, and so on) and
that property law employs many visual metaphors ("body politic,"
"bird on a wagon,"5 and so on). Rose's main, typically revisionist
claim is that the sense of sight - in general and in connection with
property - is epistemologically more constructive than its critics
contend; that it is just as "interactive" and social as the senses of
hearing or smell; that it sensitizes us to the ephemeral character of
?ll rights as much as to their solidity; and that it is fully compatible
with the telling of stories and thus is not vulnerable to the charge
that it "eradicates ... the dimension of time, and with time, the
importance of experience and even consciousness" (p. 270). But in
the midst of this abstrlj.se - and not wholly convincing - argument, Rose pauses to explore a more mundane - and illuminating
- topic. Although visual metaphors are not inherently misleading,
she argues, some of the metaphors we have developed to describe
property rights are. Specifically, the comparison of a fee simple to a
"bundle of sticks," although useful for some purposes, unfortu4. See pp. 18-20. Note that it is this concluding point - not the positive economic argument that precedes it- that finds its way into the most popular first-year property casebook.
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 19-20.
5. 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 'II 670[2], at 60-6 {Patrick J.
· Rohan ed., 1996) (asserting that a real covenant is annexed to an estate "like a bird riding on
a wagon").
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nately inclines us to think of all of the entitlements that make up a
property right as easily separable and "all more or less alike"
(p. 280). This tendency, she plausibly contends, impedes our ability
to deal sensibly with particular doctrinal problems - such as (she
might have suggested) the issue of when a governmental regulation
of land use goes so far as to constitute a "taking."6 A metaphor
more sensitive to the heterogeneity and interdependence of the
rights constitutive of ownership, she playfully but shrewdly proposes, would be "[t]oys in a toy chest" (p. 280). Similarly suggestive
tangents abound in the other essays.7
In view of Rose's evident familiarity with contemporary narrative theory, it is hard to believe that these stylistic innovations are
inadvertent. An important substantive aspiration of her book, she
frequently tells us, is to destabilize conventional understandings of
ownership. The novel organization of the argument is equally effective in challenging conventional expectations concerning the proper
form of legal scholarship. In view of her equally apparent familiarity with contemporary feminist theory,8 it is also hard not to associate the stylistic innovations with Rose's gender. In many other
fields - literary theory and anthropology come to mind most
quickly - feminist theorists during the past decade have insisted
upon the interdependence of misogynist substantive views and patriarchal narrative forms.9 Dislodging one requires dislodging the
other. Although Rose never expressly aligns herself with such
projects, she at least is proceeding along a parallel course.
The novelty of the form of the book should not be exaggerated,
however. One never has any doubt when reading through these
essays that they were produced by a single author. Rose's voice
appears to have changed little over the decade in which they were
written. More importantly, the same concerns recur in most of the
essays. Three themes are particularly prominent and merit response: an effort to refine the conventional utilitarian theory of
property and the associated progressive history of property doc6. Compare, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (empha·
sizing the magnitude of the economic impact of the regulation on the owner of the land,
rather than the character of the entitlement abridged) with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat·
tan CA1V Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (going to the opposite extreme by holding that any
impairment of a landowner's right to exclude others, no matter how trivial, constitutes a
taking).
7. For example, the central topic of the second essay is how narratives concerning the
origin of private property rights have enabled many theorists to conceal a gap in their arguments - namely, that the same collective-action problems that make private property rights
socially necessary would also impede the establishment of a private property regime. See pp.
37-38. Toward the end of the essay, however, Rose takes up a different issue: the possibility
that these narratives might have some hortatory value in cultivating altruism. See pp. 41-42.
8. See chapter 8.
9. See, e.g., MARILYN STRATIIERN, THE GENDER OF TIIE Gwr. PROBLEMS W1Tii WOMEN
AND PROBLEMS W1Tii SOCIETY IN MELANESIA (1988).
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trine; the excavation and defense of a competing, republican theory
of property; and a reassessment of the venerable question of the
relationship between rules and standards.
l.

CLASSICISM AND

!Ts

DISCONTENTS

Central to many of Rose's essays is an argument she describes
as the "classical theory of property." A blend of utilitarian political
theory, neoclassical economics, and materialist history, this approach contends that property rights originate in the efforts of the
members of a society to maximize their aggregate welfare. The assignment of scarce resources to individual owners, so the argument
goes, has four related beneficial effects. First, it provides the persons to whom the rights are assigned incentives to engage in socially
beneficial activities. Second, it avoids "tragedies of the commons"
- the tendency of persons who have access to unowned or communally owned resources to overuse them. Third, it reduces "rent
dissipation" - the tendency of people to spend their time grabbing
resources in the hands of others. Fourth, it facilitates commerce mutually beneficial exchanges of resources and services.
Social recognition of these advantages, the argument continues,
typically occurs in three stages. In stage one, there is more than
enough of a resource to satisfy all members of the society. Consequently everyone is permitted to appropriate as much as she wishes
and no effort is made to manage the resource. Stage two represents
an intermediate or transitional phase. As the free-for-all of the initial period threatens to exhaust the resource, "a group or tribe may
jointly take over the resource - such as a hunting area or a set of
common fields - and reserve access to its own members, perhaps
allocating in-group access according to a set of informal customary
arrangements" (p. 164). Increasing scarcity eventually renders this
arrangement inadequate, whereupon the members of the society
typically shift in stage three to a full-blown property regime, in
which discrete pieces of the resource are assigned to individual
owners. This :final phase is not static, however; legal rules are constantly adjusted to provide the individual owners socially optimal
incentives to use and conserve the resources that have been entrusted to them.
Rose's posture toward the classical theory is complex. Sometimes she relies, seemingly uncritically, on ·the standard story to
make sense of some aspect of property law. In the first essay, for
instance, she observes that several doctrines in Anglo-American
law place a premium on "clear acts of possession" - manifestations of dominion sufficiently obvious to be noticed by members of
the pertinent community. The most important of these doctrines
doctrine is the :first-occupancy principle, mentioned above, which
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assigns ownership of certain objects to the persons who first visibly
take hold of them. Another is adverse possession, under which a
trespasser can acquire title to land only if his long-continued wrongful occupancy is, among other things, sufficiently "notorious." The
best explanation of such rules, Rose contends, is that, by quickly
and reliably assigning resources to determinate people, they minimize rent-seeking (p. 16). To be sure, they sometimes result in the
allocation of resources to persons not in the best position to put
them to productive use, but as long as the entitlements are clearcut, such misallocations can be easily corrected through voluntary
bargains. This explanation, which emphasizes the economic advantages of consensus concerning who owns what, also helps explain
the willingness of courts, when deciding cases on the edges of these
doctrines, to defer to customary understandings within particular
communities regarding what counts as possession. The overall effect of the argument is to reinforce the economists' contention that,
when resources are scarce, private property rights - and the particular rules adopted by courts to administer the private-property
regime - operate to maximize the aggregate welfare of the members of a society.
This sort of uncritical acceptance and amplification of the classical theory is, however, unusual in the book. More often, Rose
seeks to modify or refine the standard story in some way. A fine
illustration is her highly original essay on the history of water law
(pp. 163-96). In both England and the United States, Rose points
out, sharp-edged property rights in water did not emerge in the way
or at the time the classical theory would seem to predict. Indeed,
doctrinal development in this field seems sometimes to have moved
backward, as when the English courts abandoned relatively clearcut, stage-three-style doctrines (such as the rules in force before the
middle of the eighteenth century, favoring "ancient" uses, or the
regime advocated by Blackstone and others in the late eighteenth
century, favoring the first person to put water to productive use)
and replaced them with more vague, stage-two-style doctrines (such
as the muddy "reasonable-use" rule). What, according to Rose, explains these and other deviations from the expected pattern? The
answer is not, as one might expect, that the classical story is wrong.
Rather, she argues, each regime was indeed optimal during the period in which it emerged, but for reasons not noticed by the developers of the classical theory. For example, the first-occupancy rule
- employed in England in the late eighteenth century and in Massachusetts for much of the early nineteenth century - was well
suited to the kinds of disputes that dominated those jurisdictions at
those times, in which the plaintiffs typically complained that the defendants, by constructing dams downstream, had thrown water back
upon the plaintiffs' water wheels. In such situations, it was most
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important that the disputants know their rights; if, by chance, the
first appropriator was not the most efficient user of the water, the
other party could and should buy him out. By contrast, when the
paradigmatic disputes involved defendants who either diverted
water from a stream or cast debris into it, thereby injuring many
riparian owners downstream, lawmakers, sensing that collective-action problems would prevent Coasean bargains, adopted the reasonable-use rule, which, in view of the public-goods characteristics
of moderately scarce water used primarily for power instead of consumption, approximated the efficient solution. The principal lesson
of the analysis is that each of the legal regimes adopted over the
centuries to handle conflicts over water actually made good economic sense.
A more far-reaching and overtly iconoclastic argument of the
same general form dominates The Comedy of the Commons (pp.
105-62). The essay begins with a demonstration that English and
American law contains three mechanisms by which the "public" either the sovereign or, more interestingly, an unorganized nongovernmental "public" - can assert or acquire property rights: the
"public trust" doctrine, in which the community as a whole is
deemed to have inalienable rights to certain resources; the related
doctrines of prescription and implied dedication, which grant the
public permanent easements in lands over which they have long
regularly traveled; and the doctrine of customary rights, which converts ancient customary practices (such as conducting an annual festival on particular lands) into permanent property rights. She then
carefully traces the history of the application of these doctrines to a
variety of important resources: roads, navigable streams, tidal
lands, town greens, and so on. The classical theory, she argues convincingly, cannot account for the persistence or expansion of these
doctrines. Classical theorists' only justification for public property
is that negative externalities resulting from uncontrolled private exploitation of resources sometimes can be efficiently controlled only
through government ownership and management, and that argument fails to make sense of many of the historical examples she
catalogues. But this powerful critique does not prompt Rose, as
one might expect, to repudiate the wealth-maximization hypothesis.
On the contrary, she offers a clever explanation of why these doctrines and practices, upon reflection, operated and continue to operate to make everyone better off. Certain resources, she argues,
are most valuable when used by an indefinite and unlimited number
of persons. When those resources are also physically susceptible of
monopolization by private persons - i.e., when "holdout
problems" are likely to prevent voluntary transfers of those resources from individuals to the collectivity - then semi-compulsory uncompensated acquisitions of the resources in question by the
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public make good economic sense. Lo and behold, the three
Anglo-American public-property doctrines, as refined by the courts
during the nineteenth and twentieth century, take hold in precisely
- and only - those circumstances.
The cumulative effect of arguments of this sort is a picture of
property law similar to those supplied by Richard Posner10 and
Robert Ellickson,11 but more supple and nuanced. Like Posner and
Ellickson, Rose seems (most of the time) to believe that legal rules
ought to be shaped to maximize aggregate consumer welfare and
that Anglo-American property law in fact has done a remarkably
good job of achieving that end - but she is less wedded than either
author to the notion that, except in unusual circumstances, a crisp
system of individual private rights best manages scarce resources.
This flexibility enables her to be even more sanguine than her comrades in arms - even more adept at providing plausible economic
rationales for the oddities of our current legal system.
In the end, however, Rose's explanations, ingenious as they may
be, are not fully convincing. Three related difficulties afflict each of
her arguments in this vein. First, even her nuanced narratives cannot account for all of the case law in the fields she considers. In
water law, for example, many courts defied her guidelines for efficient adjustment of riparian rights. Confronted with disputes involving the diversion or pollution of streams, they sometimes opted
not for the reasonable-use rule - Rose's preferred solution - but
for either prescriptive easements12 or the natural-flow rule.13 For
backflow cases, Rose advocates the prior-appropriation doctrine,
but the courts did not always agree. 14 In general, antebellum water
law was substantially more chaotic than Rose would have us believe.15 Her account of the development of public property rights is
similarly flawed. Although her analysis goes far toward explaining
and justifying the expansion during much of American history of
the public-trust and public-prescriptive-easement doctrines, it fails
to makes sense of the fact that the doctrine of customary rights was
sharply curtailed by American courts beginning at least as early as
the antebellum period.16
10. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 3.1 (3d ed. 1986).
11. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Bullen v. Runnels, 2 N.H. 255, 257 (1820).
13. See, e.g., Sackrider v. Beers, 10 Johns. 241 (N.Y. 1913).
14. See, e.g., Gilman v. Tiiton, 5 N.H. 231, 232-33 (1830).
15. See William Fisher, The Law of the Land: An Intellectual History of American Property Doctrine, 1776-1880, at 239-54 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard).
16. Rose acknowledges American courts' hostility to the doctrine. Pp. 122-28. However,
she does not attempt to reconcile that fact with her analysis of the economic merits of the
doctrine. Pp. 124-27.
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Second, the judges and legislators who shaped these doctrines
described their objectives in terms that do not align closely with
Rose's analysis. To be sure, they included among their goals things
that Rose would find congenial - facilitating commerce, fostering
the productive use of resources, etc. - but they also thought they
were advancing other ends as well, such as protecting the rights of
individual landowners against potentially tyrannical majorities and
rendering decisions that fairly reflected the equities of individual
controversies.17 It would be surprising if these aspirations did not
often prompt them to deviate from the criterion of economic
efficiency.
.
Finally, Rose fails to identify the mechanism by which the law
came to embody economic wisdom. Other historians and economists, convinced that there is an economic logic to legal history,
have suggested several possible mechanisms. Each of their theories, however, suffers from serious difficulties. Rose's account, instead of addressing those problems, exacerbates them.
The simplest and most commonly held view is exemplified by
Richard Posner's work. The reasons that the common law has
evolved in the direction of economic efficiency, Posner contends,
are: (1) most economic principles are "commonsensical";18 (2)
common sense in the United States in the nineteenth century, when
the common law acquired much of its modem shape, was especially
favorable to economic principles;19 (3) most judges have been
shrewd enough to realize that the legislature is better equipped
than the judiciary to (re)distribute wealth, and that, accordingly,
they should devote their energies to shaping rules that increase the
size of the pie to be distributed;20 and (4) judges' aspirations to
render "fair" decisions did not conflict with that commitment, because most conceptions of fairness are, at bottom, disguised intuitions concerning economic efficiency.21 An obvious objection to
this argument is that lawmakers often say they are trying to achieve
things - such as the protection of "rights" for their own sake that have long been thought to conflict with the pursuit of economic
17. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
18. See PosNER, supra note 10, § 8.1, at 232.
19. See id. § 8.1-.4. The "educated classes" accorded considerable importance to economic growth, and many were steeped "in a laissez-faire ideology based on classical economics." Id. § 2.2, at 21.
20. See id. § 8.1, at 232. For recent defenses of the view that Posner attributes to judges,
see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 110-13 (1983);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
21. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) ("Because we do not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable
overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to the
accident").
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efficiency.22 A less obvious objection, developed by Gillian Hadfield, is that judges do not encounter a random sample of disputes,
and thus, even if they were exclusively concerned with the maximization of wealth, the biases in the information they receive
would prevent them from achieving their goal.23 Rose now supplies
us with another reason to doubt the Posnerian mechanism: the
legal rule that would result in the most efficient exploitation and
management of a scarce resource, she persuasively argues, is often
not at all "commonsensical" (p. 232). Indeed, most of the political
theorists and economists who have hitherto discussed the rules pertaining to riparian rights, navigable waterways, roads, town greens,
and so on have failed to discern the optimal solutions. It seems
highly unlikely that busy judges, proceeding on the basis of intuition, could have done better.
An alternative mechanism might be derived from the recent
work of Robert Ellickson. The informal, customary norms that
arise in close-knit communities, Ellickson argues, often work remarkably effectively to maximize the welfare of the members of
those communities. So, for example, the norms that evolved among
nineteenth-century whalers and twentieth-century ranchers did a
remarkably good job of minimizing the costs - "deadweight
losses" and "transaction costs" - associated with conflicts over
whales and the injuries caused by trespassing cattle.24 By observing
that judges, when shaping the common law, often defer to well-established, welfare-enhancing customs, one might - although Ellickson himself does not - seek to explain why common law
doctrines of the sort charted by Rose seemed to evolve so nicely in
the direction of allocative efficiency. This explanatory edifice
would have several weaknesses, however, only two of which need
be mentioned here.25 First, Ellickson carefully and sensibly limits
his argument to the informal norms developed by close-knit social
groups, and many of the rules that concern Rose did not arise in
such communal settings. Second, Ellickson also notes that his argument can explain at most the evolution of "workaday" norms
(norms that regulate people's everyday affairs), not "foundational"
norms such as the fundamental principles that protect persons and

See supra text accompanying note 17.
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEo. L.J. 583 (1992).
See ROBERT c. ELUCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 184-206 (1991); Robert c. EllickHypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L.
& ORO. 83 (1989).
For others, see Robert Merges, Among the Tribes of Shasta County, 18 LAW & Soc.
INoumY 299 (1993).
22.
23.
24.
son, A
ECON.
25.
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property;26 the latter, of course, are precisely the kinds of norms
with which Rose is concerned.
The third possible mechanism might be described as the naturalselection theory of common law development. Even if judges have
no economic aptitude or aspirations, some economists have argued,
the common law will gradually evolve in the direction of efficiency
because disputants are more likely to litigate (and to request reformation of the extant rules) when those rules are inefficient than
when they are already efficient.27 The many difficulties associated
with this argument need not detain us, because even the more enthusiastic proponents of the theory acknowledge that, for the evolutionary mechanism to work, at least three conditions must obtain:
(1) both the plaintiffs and the defendants in a substantial proportion of the controversies that arise under a rule are "repeat players"
with sufficient long-term stakes in the content of the rule to justify
the expense of litigation; (2) transaction costs prevent the affected
parties from "bargaining around" an inefficient rule; and (3) judges
are not pursuing any objectives other than economic efficiency with
enough vigor to swamp the mild pressure exerted by the differential
pattern of litigation. In most of the fields of property law discussed
by Rose, at least one of these conditions does not hold. In many of
the areas (e.g., public prescriptive easements, adverse possession),
affected parties tend not to be repeat players. In other contexts
(e.g., controversies between adjacent riparian owners), transaction
costs are low. Finally and most importantly, for the reasons
sketched above, judges administering these fields have frequently
sought explicitly to advance or respect noneconomic values.
In sum, the revisionist arguments deployed by Rose seeking to
make economic sense of property laws that seem inconsistent with
the classical story are clever and in some cases plausible, but she
has not solved - and indeed may have amplified - important difficulties associated with the positive economic interpretation of the
common law.

II. RIVAL THEORIES OF PROPERTY
The classical theory, although certainly the most popular and
probably the most powerful of the perspectives on property, is not,
Rose insists, the only game in town. She devotes two of the essays
26. See ELLICKSON, supra note 24, at 283-84. For a criticism of this distinction, see Lewis
A. Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order?, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 647, 653 (1992) (book review).
27. A relatively simple argument of this general form is contained in Paul H. Rubin, Why
ls the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). More complex and qualified
versions are deployed in PAUL RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW (1983);
Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of
Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980).
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in her book to the elaboration and partial defense of a dramatically
different view: what she refers to as the theory of the "ancient
constitution."
To understand the character and importance of Rose's argument, one needs some historiographic background. Beginning in
the 1960s, two lines of innovative scholarship laid the foundation
for a dramatic reassessment of the character of the American
Revolution and indeed of the whole of American political history.
First, philosophers, anthropologists, and historians of science began
paying much greater attention to the ways in which ideological filters influence how people perceive and construct their social and
physical environments.28 Second, a group of British historians argued convincingly that the "Country" party in mid-eighteenth-century England derived many of its ideas from the venerable
ideological tradition of classical republicanism.29 Republicanism, as
these scholars explicated it, revolved around the following propositions: active, altruistic involvement in public affairs is essential to a
good life; to be an effective and responsible citizen, a man must be
economically and psychologically "independent," which in tum requires that he own at least a modest amount of property and not
have to rely on the monarch, or anyone else, for his livelihood; and
a healthy polity .embodying these ideals is delicate and easily infected by the diseases of "luxury," "corruption," and standing armies.30 Observing that the same ideas figured prominently in the
political discourse of the British North American colonies, a group
of historians led by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J.G.A.
Pocock invoked the new understanding of the mind-shaping power
of ideology to mount a successful assault on the then-dominant interpretation of the origins of the Revolution.31 To explain the
break with England, they insisted, we must look not to the logic of
Lockean liberalism or to the material interests of the Patriots,32 but
to how the ideology of republicanism caused the colonists to perceive the relatively innocuous initiatives of the British imperial authorities as fundamental threats to their liberties.
28. See, e.g., PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE {1966); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES {1973); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE SmUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS {1962).
29. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT {1975); CAROLINE ROB·
BINS, THE EIGHTEENTH·CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN (1959).
30. See PococK, supra note 29, at 361-422.
31. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); POCOCK, supra note 29, at 462-552; GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-17frl {1969).
32. For expressions of these interpretations, see CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS {2d ed. 1942); ARTHUR
MEIER SCHLESINGER, NEW VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY {1922).
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This new reading of the Revolution was both powerful and suggestive. Alerted to the content and importance of classical republicanism, other historians began to see signs of its persistence into
later periods. Jeffersonianism, the Jacksonian and Whig persuasions, the aspirations of antebellum working-class movements, and
late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century protest movements were all reread as avatars of the classical vision.33 The net
result was a conception of the overall shape of American political
history radically different from the one that had prevailed during
the previous generation. Where Louis Hartz and Daniel Boorstin
had seen a stable liberal consensus established with the first settlements and continuing to the present, the revisionist historians saw a
grand narrative of ideological struggle and transformation. A republican orthodoxy, they contended, had powered the Revolution
and helped determine the original shape of the nation, but sometime between the drafting of the Federal Constitution and the end
of the nineteenth century (exactly when was a matter of much controversy) it had been largely, though not completely, displaced by a
liberal ideology. This ideology was less interested in civic virtue
and political participation; more receptive, to individualism, commerce, and capitalism; and more protective of private rights. Republicanism had not disappeared altogether, but it had become a
suppressed, subordinate ideology.34
In the 1980s, an important group of law professors sought to
extract from this :q.ew vision of American history lessons for their
own fields. Some of these scholars argued that republicanism provides us conceptions of the good life and the good society superior
to those supplied by liberalism and should prompt us to reconstruct
several fields of contemporary doctrine. For example, cities and
other fora for the exercise of citizenship should be accorded greater
autonomy and power; businesses should be discouraged from moving their bases of operation when the result would be to disrupt
local communities; group libel laws and limits on campaign contributions should not be deemed to violate the First Amendment; and
courts should encourage legislatures to engage in empathetic
33. See, e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A
PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); DREW R. McCoY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY
IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1990); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORI<
CITY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850 (1984); THOMAS BROWN,
POLITICS AND STATESMANSHIP: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY {1985); Lary May,

Movie Star Politics: The Screen Actors' Guild, Cultural Conversion, and the Hollywood Red
Scare, in RECASTING AMERICA: CULTURE AND PoLmcs IN THE AGE OF COLD WAR 125
(Lary May ed., 1989).
34. For a fine sketch of the emergence of this view - and, in particular, of the controversy concerning the timing of the suppression of republicanism - see Daniel T. Rodgers,
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 19-20 {1992).
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processes of rational deliberation.3s Other scholars were less
programmatic and invoked republicanism for heuristic purposes as a generator of arguments we might consider, rather than as a
blueprint for reform.36
In the past decade, the republican reconceptualization of American history and law has lost much, though not all, of its momentum. A growing group of historians has contended that it is
misleading to describe our ideological history in terms of a struggle
between two discrete worldviews - that Americans' political
thought has been more creative and eclectic than such a narrative
would suggest.37 At the same time, political and legal theorists
have become more sensitive to the unattractive features of the
classical republican vision - its association with slavery, its pugnacious cast, its sexism, and its apparent incompatibility with cultural
pluralism.38 Proposals that we reformulate contemporary doctrines
to track the republican outlook have, accordingly, become less
common.
One of the causalities of these historiographic struggles was the
clarity and coherence of our understanding of the outlook of the
Antifederalists, the eclectic group who opposed the ratification of
the Federal Constitution. Before 1965, when the Constitution was
seen by most historians as the natural outgrowth of the same Lockean impulse that produced the Revolution itself,39 the Antifederalists were generally seen as paranoid and short-sighted - "men of
little faith," as Cecilia Kenyon called them.4 o By contrast, in
Gordon Wood's great revisionist study of the founding of the nation, the Antifederalists were depicted as valiant, even heroic,
champions of the dying ideology of classical republicanism, resisting
the liberal innovations of the Federalists.41 As the Bailyn-Wood35. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L REv. 1511, 1515-16, 1528-41 {1992); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 543-57 {1986); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Note, A
Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REv. 682 {1988).
36. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L REV. 291, 292-94, 314-15
{1989); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335, 1338-50
{1991).
37. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 273 {1991); Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional Traditions,
29 WM. & MARYL. REv. 75, 77-78 (1987); James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism:
Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 14 J. AM. HIST.
9 (1987); Rodgers, supra note 34, at 34-38.
38. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1713 {1988).
39. For the major exception, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES {1913).
40. See Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser., 3 (1955).
41. See Wooo, supra note 31, chs. 10, 12.
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Pocock reconceptualization has come under increasing attack, this
image has blurred - to the point where, in Wood's most recent
book on the Revolution, the Federalists have become the custodians of the republican outlook, while the Antifederalists appear as
hardheaded, acquisitive, individualistic liberals.42
The third and fourth essays in Rose's book provide a novel perspective on these debates - not a dramatic reformulation, but a
helpful set of adjustments. She begins with the shrewd observation
that classical republicanism was just one variant of a general outlook toward politics, society, and property widely held by Western
Europeans prior to the late eighteenth century (pp. 73-78). Commonly associated with the phrases, "ancient constitution" and "propriety," this outlook placed much stock in "long-standing ways of
doing things, justified either by the sheer antiquity of practice or by
the wisdom and suitableness that antiquity signifies" (p. 73). Hostile to the centralization of political power and to the equalization
of individuals' fortunes and "privileges," this outlook championed
"local particularism" - preservation of the powers and perquisites
of the many social and political organizations that lay outside the
control of the increasingly powerful European monarchs.
The American Antifederalists, Rose argues, were the carriers of
this political tradition (pp. 85-92). Whereas the Federalists advocated the centralization of political power, the promotion of commerce, and secure private property rights of the sort that would
facilitate commerce, the Antifederalists clung to an older set of values: localism, the importance of civic virtue, and "proper" property
rights - i.e., holdings appropriate to each person's station and civic
responsibility. In two senses, she contends, the Antifederalists
"lost" (p. 85). First, the Constitution not only was ratified but became a sacred document, a central feature of Americans' self-conception. Second and less obviously, the outlook of Antifederalism
has not figured significantly in our theories of either government or
property. She argues, however, that the Antifederalist vision has
had a little-noticed but powerful impact on American culture: it
has found expression in and helped to sustain. a strong tradition of
political localism. Even today, we can "see a number of the Antifederalist attitudes and concerns in our local politics: the acceptance of community definitions of the rights and responsibilities of
property, the concern for virtue and corruption, the possibility for
personal participation or voice, the further possibility for choice
through the 'exit' option" (p. 89). We would do well, Rose contends, to pay greater attention to the merits of these aspects of our
political practice and to ensure that they endure.
42. See
{1991).

GORDON

s.

Wooo,
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In three respects, this modestly revisionist narrative is valuable.
First, it helps bring back into focus our picture of the worldviews
and legacies of Federalism and Antifederalism. All historical analogies have their limitations, but Rose's characterization of the Federalists as "monarchists" and the Antifederalists as defenders of the
"ancient constitution" rings more true than any of the recent efforts
to align the two groups with the categories of liberalism and republicanism. Rose's detailed account of the persistence of a tradition
of localism also seems less pretentious and more illuminating than
other historians' efforts to document the enduring power of the detailed ideology of civic humanism.
Second, by attempting less than the champions of republicanism, Rose's effort to harness history for normative purposes accomplishes more. Reminding us of the merits of localism is less grand,
but more constructive, than invocations of James Harrington and
the Commonwealthmen in reformations of contemporary constitutional or administrative law. To be sure, Rose sometimes stretches
her points - as when she suggests that Americans have paid
greater attention to questions of "virtue" and corruption when engaged in local politics than when participating in national elections
(p. 87), or when she assures us that the ability of citizens to "exit"
from their localities has operated historically as an effective check
on oppressive or racist practices by municipalities (p. 90). These
enthusiasms aside, however, Rose's retelling of the story represents
a substantial advance.
Third, Rose has succeeded in her central ambition: to hold up a
developed conception of property and its relationship to social and
political life that can stand as a viable alternative to the classical
utilitarian vision. She is correct that conceiving of "property as propriety" provides us a vantage point and basis for reform dramatically different from the orthodox perspective.
This third accomplishment comes at a cost, however. In her
haste to deploy and accredit the Antifederalist vision, Rose brushes
aside or ignores two other substantial theories of property that
could have assisted her in her larger project of highlighting the contingency of the classical view. The first of these is the labor-desert
theory. Originally developed by Locke and updated and modified
by a variety of modern political and legal theorists, the labor theory
centers on the notion that, by laboring upon an object or resource
held "in common," a person acquires a natural property right in the
thing with which he has mixed his labor - a property right that the
state has a duty to respect and protect.43 At two points, Rose turns
43. See JoHN LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF Gov.
ERNMENT ch. 5 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed. 1960) {1690); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS
(1985); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); Wendy J. Gordon, A Prop·
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her attention to the Lockean theory; both times, she puts it down.
In'her book's opening essay, Possession as the Origin of Property
(pp. 11-28), she briefly considers the labor theory as a possible explanation and justification for the common law rule awarding ownership to the first person to reduce a resource to "firm
possession."44 Two difficulties, she contends, prevent it from serving effectively in that capacity. First, it fails to explain why a laborer should be deemed to own his own labor and thus is incapable
of explaining why labor upon an unowned object creates a property
right rather than merely dissipating the laborer's energy (p. 11).
Second, the theory contains no guidelines for determining "the
scope of the right that one establishes by mixing the owned thing
(one's labor) with something else" (p. 11). The other occasion
arises in the course of a brusque review of Stephen Munzer's book,
A Theory of Property. 45 Munzer argues that three principles shape
American property law: "(a) preference satisfaction (that is, a combined version of efficiency and utility), (b) justice and equality, and_
(c) desert" (by which Munzer means primarily providing appropriate rewards to labor) (p. 51). What Munzer fails to recognize, Rose
contends, is that principles (b) and (c) are, in truth, nothing more
than derivatives of principle (a) (pp. 55-58). In particular, the proposition that a laborer deserves a reward "is an obvious corollary to
a property regime that tries to increase the bag of goodies by encouraging the investment of effort and time" (p. 57). The labordesert argument, in other words, fails to provide a normative criterion that is not ultimately reducible to wealth-maximization.
Two circumstances should make us hesitate before accepting
Rose's dismissal of the labor-desert theory. First, countless judges
and legislators have relied - and continue to rely - on it when
shaping property rights.46 Rose's excavation of the outlook of Antifederalism is inspired partly by the notion that a challenge to the
classical theory of property is most likely to be effective if it can
draw on elements of our own political and legal tradition; the same
notion should make her pause before discarding a nonutilitarian
theory of property rights that has already played a substantial role
in the shaping of our law. Second, when polled concerning the ideal
criterion of distributive justice, the large majority of Americans
(and Western Europeans) offer some variant of what social psychologists call the "equity theory" - the gist of which is that each pererty Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 y ALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
44. The explanation she prefers is sketched supra on pp. 1779-80.
45. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990).
46. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562-63
(1984); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236, 239-40 (1918); In re
Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 76-77 (Colo. 1978).
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son deserves a share of the fruits of a collective enterprise
proportionate to his or her contribution to the venture.47 That outlook is sufficiently close to the Lockean vision that, again it would
behoove Rose to pause before tossing Locke aside.
To be sure, the difficulties toward which Rose points are substantial - too substantial to be definitively resolved here - but
Rose is wrong to suggest that they are obviously insurmountable.
The justification for the notion that a person owns his own labor
might be derived from a variety of sources: what Locke calls "natural reason";4s Rawls' technique of "reflective equilibrium";49 or
perhaps, indirectly, through rumination concerning the immorality
of slavery, the system in which a person's right to her own labor is
most explicitly denied. The famous proportionality problem - the
difficulty of determining the scope of the property right produced
by labor upon an unowned object50 - might be addressed through
an elaboration of the Lockean "sufficiency" proviso: the notion
that one cannot through labor acquire a natural property right unless "enough, and as good [is] left in common for others."51 Finally,
the proposition that one can finds strains of utilitarianism in
Locke's theory is correct (and familiar),52 but Rose improperly infers from that fact that the labor-desert argument has no independent normative power. Rose goes astray partly by assuming too
quickly that one deserves a reward only for a certain type of labor:
"labor that produces goods or services that people want" (p. 57).
Property theorists working this vein have proposed a variety of
other criteria for identifying work of the sort that can underlie natural property rights: the sheer expenditure of time and effort;53 engaging in activities that one would prefer not to do and others
would prefer not to do;54 and "creative" or "transformative" la47. For a discussion of equity theory, see MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 9-10 (1985). For a summary of the empirical work
showing the popularity of the theory among contemporary Americans and Western Europe·
ans, see J. Stacy Adams & Sara Freedman, Equity Theory Revisited: Comments and Annotated Bibliography, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43, 47-49
(Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Waister eds., 1976).
48. See LOCKE, supra note 43, at 303.
49. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 48-51 (1971).
SO. For the classic illustration of this difficulty, see NozrcK, supra note 43, at 257-60.
51. LocKE, supra note 43, at 306. For some work in this general vein, see Gordon, supra
note 43.
52. See, e.g., ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 14-48 (1984).
53. Locke himself seems to have had such a criterion in mind, or at least he seems uninterested in whether the laborer's activity produced things that other people (as opposed to
the laborer himself) valued. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
GEO. LJ. 'lZT, 305 (1988).
54. See id. at 302.
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bor.ss Adoption of one of these alternative interpretations would
make the argument far less vulnerable to assimilation by the utilitarian juggernaut. To repeat: the point is not that the difficulties in
the Lockean vision identified by Rose are easily remedied, but
rather that they are not necessarily insoluble and that there are
good reasons - reasons with which Rose herself should agree for continuing to work on them.
The other potentially powerful theoretical rival of the classical
theory of property is the personality or "personhood" theory of
property. Its core is the notion that persons need stable control
over certain objects and a certain amount of resources in order fully
to be able to realize their selves, and the law ought to ascertain and
respect, in the form of property rights, persons' claims to those resources. Less well grounded in Anglo-American political theory
and legal practice than the labor-desert theory, this argument nevertheless has a respectable theoretical lineage (originating, as it
does, in the writings of Kant and Hegel), many manifestations in
modem property doctrine, and some formidable contemporary exponents.s6 Yet it does not figure at all in Rose's book. Again, if her
ultimate goal is to destabilize - by revealing the contingency of the classical, utilitarian vision, she would do well not to neglect such
potentially powerful allies.
III.

FORMS OF NORMS

In the le~con of contemporary American legal theory, "rules"
are crisp legal norms that direct a decisionmaker's attention to a
few pertinent aspects of a dispute and thereby enable her to resolve
the controversy in a determin~te, predictable manner.57 "Standards" are more open-ended !egal norms that instruct a decisionmaker to consider many aspects of a dispute and compel her to
exercise discretion in determining the relative weight of those aspects and thus how the controversy should be resolved.58
55. Cf. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving To Own Intellectual Property, 68 Cm.-KENT L.
609 (1993) (emphasizing the distinction between ordinary labor and creative, original
labor). '
56. The best analyses of the origins and implications of the theory are MARGARET JANE
RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) and JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
57. An example would be a rule prescribing that, if a person dies intestate survived by a
spouse and two children, his or her spouse shall receive one-half of the decedent's real and
personal property, and the children each shall receive one-quarter. For a more complex but
similarly crystalline rule, see MAss. GEN. L. ch. 190, §§ 1-3 (1994).
58. An example would be a norm directing a judge, when apportioning marital property
to spouses who are obtaining a divorce, to consider:
"the duration of the marriage • . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each
of the parties ... the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preserREv.
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A substantial body of literature explores the relative merits of
these two forms. 59 Rules, it is often said, have two principal advantages. First, by providing private parties reliable guidance concerning their rights and duties, rules facilitate planning and trade and
discourage rent seeking, thereby enhancing productivity and economic efficiency. Second, by diminishing the discretion exercised
by judges and the corresponding dangers of bias and corruption,
rules increase the chances that like cases will be decided alike and
that elected representatives will determine the principles by which
we are governed. Rules, in other words, facilitate democracy and
fidelity to the "rule of law." Standards, by contrast, are said to have
three advantages. First, they contribute to economic efficiency by
encouraging foolish and ignorant parties (who, in a society dominated by hard-edged rules, are likely to fear exploitation by the
shrewd and informed) to get involved in economic activity - to
invest in companies, buy houses, and so on. Second, by avoiding
the inevitable over- and under-inclusiveness of rules, standards
make possible more precise implementation of substantive policy
goals. Third, standards foster a deliberative or conversational approach to dispute resolution in which judges make their decisions
only after consulting among themselves and with the disputants
concerning the most just outcome - a method that fosters both
contextually sensitive rulings and normatively attractive modes of
governance.
In Crystals and Mud in Property Law (pp. 199-202), Rose reflects on how this debate illuminates - and is illuminated by - the
content and history of property doctrine. As is true of most of her
essays, Rose approaches the topic from several disparate angles.
The most predictable of the perspectives is normative: Rose seeks
to add to the evaluative literature summarized in the preceding paragraph (p. 202). Her contributions in this vein are only modest.
She nicely summarizes but does not materially refine the debate
concerning the relationship between the forms of norms and economic efficiency, and she devotes little attention to the
noneconomic dimensions on which rules and standards differ. Even
vation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit."
UNIF. MARRIAGE & D1voRCE Acr § 307(a), 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987) (alternative A of
§ 307).

59. The principal pertinent works are: MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECJSION·MAKING IN LAw AND IN LIFE (1991); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of
Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379
(1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L REv. 22 (1992).
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in 1988, when the essay was first published, one could find more
rich treatments of the subject elsewhere, and today one would certainly not look to Crystals and Mud for an answer to the question
whether rules or standards are better.
More intriguing is Rose's discussion of the didactic messages
conveyed by the two types of norms. Building on the seminal article by Duncan Kennedy, Rose observes that rules and standards
express radically different conceptions of ourselves and the ways in
which we wish to associate with each other. Rules connote or celebrate individualism, separateness, liberalism, predictability, and security. Standards connote or celebrate community, connectedness,
altruism, flexibility, and vulnerability. It is far from clear, Rose argues convincingly, that the two types of norms in fact advance the
ideals with which they are conventionally associated. Thus, rules,
by facilitating commerce, may foster "sociability" and community
more than standards, and it is no accident that philanthropy flourished during historical periods dominated by rules and the related
ideology of classical liberalism. By contrast, as the drafters of the
UCC recognized, within a community whose members share customs and a vocabulary, standards - like "commercial reasonableness" - may result in more predictable decisionmaking than
crystalline rules. However, the fact that the two types of norms do
not necessarily serve the values with which they are commonly associated only enhances their rhetorical importance. Our endless
debate over rules and standards reflects and helps sustain a
profound and unresolved tension in our aspirations: Do we "view
friends, family, and fellow citizens from the same cool distance as
those we do not know at all," or do we "treat even those to whom
we have no real connection with the kind of engagement that we
normally reserve for friends and partners?" (p. 225). In presenting
the topic this way, Rose draws upon and amplifies one of the central arguments of the original incarnation of Critical Legal
Studies.60
The most original and provocative of the views Rose takes of
the rule/standards debate concerns its historical dimension. Few
fields in property law, she argues, have been dominated for long by
one form or the other. The more typical pattern is an "oscillation":
sharp-edged rules gradually corrode, giving way to vague standards,
which in tum are replaced by a new regime of rules that corrode,
and so forth. For example, in the mid-twentieth century, the harsh
but crisp doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to sales of houses was
overrun by the muddy warranty of habitability, which imposed substantial but vague duties on both the builders and the sellers of
60. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 59, at 3; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 205, 211-12 (1979).
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homes. Private parties briefly were able to reinstitute a crystalline
regime through contractual waivers of this new warranty, but the
courts, by refusing to enforce such warranties, opted for standards
(pp. 202-03). Similar trends can be seen in the laws governing
mortgages, the recording of land titles, and rights to continued
flows of sunlight (pp. 201, 203-08). What accounts for these oscillations? Rose speculates that "endogenous" forces may be at work.
In other words, each form triggers behavior that precipitates a
swing to the other form. Rules, precisely because of their clarity,
tend to get "overused" (like a field held in common), thereby diminishing their reliability and prompting us to tum to standards.
Rules also commonly result in visible and galling "forfeitures" losses or penalties disproportionate to the lapses that occasioned
them - the unfairness and inefficiency of which also inclines us to
tum to standards. Eventually, however, the unpredictability and
expense of standards makes us yearn for a return to rules.
The observation that our reliance upon rules and standards to
manage our affairs has changed over time seems entirely right, but
the particular story Rose tells is misleading in two related respects.
First, during the twentieth century, most fields of property law and most other fields of American law as well - have witnessed
not an oscillation between rules and standards, but a long slide into
the pit of standards. The erosion of the hard-edged Rule Against
Perpetuities by "reform" statutes of one sort or another;61 the repudiation of the principle of caveat lessee in landlord-tenant law in
favor of the muddy implied warranty of habitability;62 the allocation
to judges of ever greater discretion for dividing spouses' property
upon divorce;63 the proliferation of vague exceptions to landowners' rights to exclude unwanted entrants;64 the abandonment of the
sharp-edged tripartite classification of tort plaintiffs injured on private land - invitees, licensees, and trespassers - in favor of a generic negligence doctrine;65 the growing importance of the
doctrines of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract;66 the deterioration of the principle that a seller of goods has no affirmative duty
to disclose information to the buyer;67 the erosion of discretion-reducing guidelines in the law of child custody in favor of the generic
61. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY 143-48 (1993).
62. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23
B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982).
63. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 307(a), 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987) (alternative A of § 307).
64. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
65. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
66. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 55-85 (1974).
67. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§§ 4.9-.15 (2d ed. 1990).
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standard of the "best interests of the child";6s and the growing popularity of discretionary "balancing tests" in constitutional law69 all
reflect shifts in the direction of standards. There are exceptions to
be sure, such as the repudiation of the negligence principle (qualified by the fellow-servant rule) in favor of worker's compensation
systems for dealing with industrial accidents or the revival of criminal sentencing guidelines. But they are just that: exceptions. Even
the fields on which Rose concentrates seem, on reflection, inconsistent with her "oscillation" thesis. For example, during the twentieth
century the law governing sales of homes has steadily become increasingly muddy; the brief retreat in the direction of rules that
Rose emphasizes did not result from any adjustment in the governing doctrine but from the efforts of private parties to employ
contractual waivers to override that doctrine - efforts the courts
soon rejected.
Recognition of this trend exposes the other weakness in Rose's
account: her reliance on "endogenous" factors to explain the relationship over time of rules and standards. To make sense of the
overwhelming recent trend in the direction of "mud," one needs to
consider forces larger than those to which Rose directs our attention. What those forces might be is far from clear. The consolidation and ascendancy, through Progressivism and then the New
Deal, of an ideology - associated primarily but not exclusively
with the Democratic Party - more receptive to altruism and
"safety nets" than individualism and self-reliance? The logic of cultural hegemony, in which "soft" legal rules are used to disguise such
things as the steadily widening gap between the rich and the poor in
the United States?70 The success (or abandonment) of the effort described by P.S. Atiyah in his related study of the development of
contract law in England - by late-nineteenth-century lawmakers
to use crystalline legal forms to instill in the populace the habits of
forceful productive activity necessary to a free market?71 The
"needs" or institutional concomitants of post-industrial welfare capitalism? Much work and thought would be required to assess these
hypotheses. The only thing that seems certain is that Rose's account is inadequate.
68. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEAR'Ili 234-85 (1985); Fran Olsen, The
Politics of Family Law, 2 LAw & lNEQ. J. 1 (1984).
69. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
LI. 943 (1987). But cf. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 60-62 (disagreeing with the conventional
view on this score).
70. Cf. Jay M. Fineman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE Pouncs OF
LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRrnouE 373, 381-85 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
71. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRACT (1979). Rose
takes note of this hypothesis on p. 213.
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CONCLUSION

Property and Persuasion deserves careful attention. Wide-ranging, well informed, highly original, playful yet serious, it will provoke many intense reactions. Under critical pressure, not all of
Rose's arguments hold up, but many do. More importantly, the
book should stimulate a series of conversations that will deepen our
understanding of property and law.

